Economic agents do not only try to find the optimal solution to a given problem, but they may also choose a different version of the problem to begin with. This is especially relevant in the case of the lifecycle optimization task where subjects have control over the steepness of their income profile through their pension participation. We devise a computer experiment to test whether (i) subject behavior is affected by the steepness of the income profile and (ii) the possibility of choosing the steepness of the income profile, affect subject behavior. Our findings suggest that, in the context of the life-cycle optimization task the steepness of the income profile has no statistically significant affect on subject performance. However, when the subjects can choose the slope of their income profile, they perform worse on average. In particular, their consumption decisions are relatively more sensitive to current conditions such as current income and financial wealth.
Introduction
Most economic models rely on the assumption that economic agents are able to solve dynamic optimization problems. However, laboratory experiments have shown that in the case of lifecycle optimization problems, subject behavior deviates significantly from the optimal solution of the given problem. The evidence suggests that, these deviations do not always arise from random decision errors and in some cases systemic behavioral biases play a role. Among these biases are, insensitivity to future prices and interest rates (Luhan et al , 2011) ; over-sensitivity to current employment status (Carbone et al 2004) .
Previous lab studies abstract from several complexities of the real problem and deal only with the efficiency of consumption decisions given an exogenous income process. For example, several studies have examined the extent to which subjects are able to smooth consumption over time and whether their saving decisions depend on income uncertainty, returns on savings etcetera.
Relatively few studies have explored the possible role that pension systems may play to facilitate such consumption smoothing. We devised a controlled laboratory experiment in order to examine the interplay of consumption decisions and the income streams when individuals have uncertain experimental lifetimes. In the first treatment, subjects face four different income profiles which differ in terms of their slope. When the income profile gets steeper, individuals get a higher level of labor related income when working and lower deferred income or benefits when retired. In this case, individuals have to rely more on private savings in order to achieve the optimal level of consumption throughout their lifetime. The first question we try to address in this paper is whether pension funds may facilitate better decision making. More precisely, we explore whether people are better (or worse) able to smooth consumption when some labor related income is taxed during their working life and provided as deferred income (pension benefits) when retired. By comparing decisions across profiles we can assess the value added of a pension fund in such a situation.
Although steeper income processes, i.e. scenarios with high labor related income and low pension income, may be regarded as more challenging, steepness of the income profile has no statistically significant effect on subject performance. This suggests that any behavioral biases that may be present are statistically unaffected by the income profile.
The second aim of our paper is to find out whether the freedom of choosing an income profile affects subjects' behavior. In reality, economic decisions of the individuals are not limited to consumption decisions, and individuals have increasingly more control over their income processes.
A particularly important trend that gives individuals such an extended responsibility is the transition from mandatory public schemes to pension schemes that are based on individual accounts. As a result of this trend, employees in many countries now have more control over their net income during their working life and retirement. To test whether this kind of increased flexibility is beneficial we have designed a second treatment. In contrast to the first treatment where subjects are given an exogenous income profile, in the second treatment individuals can choose their preferred profile prior to the optimization task. We find that in the case of the life-cycle optimization task with uncertain life-time, the ability to choose the income profile, on average, leads to worse performance and stronger rule-of-thumb behavior, in the form of higher over-sensitivity of consumption decisions to current income and financial wealth. We suggest that this pattern may arise because subjects pay less attention to the analytical solution of the problem and more attention to irrelevant attractors after choosing an income profile. This finding adds to the other behavioral biases such as myopia and status-quo bias that may affect economic decision making throughout the life-cycle. It is also in-line with a growing number of studies in the field of behavioral finance which argue that individuals do not necessarily make better decisions, when they have access to more options (e.g. Benartzi and Thaler, 2001) .
The validity of the optimization assumption, which is central to the economic analysis, is questioned by a number of economists. Thaler (1994) argues against the use of optimizing models claiming that most people do not have the ability to solve complex dynamic optimization problems and they are likely to use rules of thumb instead. However, most empirical and theoretical studies that analyze systemic deviations from optimal behavior exclusively focus exclusively on inconsistent time preferences and decision patterns that arise as a result of these preferences. Although choosing a particular way to present a problem may have important welfare implications, to the knowledge of the authors this phenomenon has not been studied empirically in the context of dynamic optimization.
Economists have devised laboratory experiments to test the validity of the optimization assumption in controlled environments and investigate different aspects of economic decision making. Hey and Dardanoni (1988) is the first study to examine subject behavior in a rather complex discrete-time dynamic optimization framework with income uncertainty. According to their findings, overall the predictive power of the life-cycle optimization theory is fairly low. Although the optimal path is independent of time in this particular experiment, the responses of the subjects are correlated with past decisions, which may reflect limited understanding of the experiment or boredom on behalf of the subjects. The consumption decisions differ significantly from the optimal ones and the subject pool is quite heterogeneous in terms of performance. However, the responses are to some extent in line with the comparative static implications of the theory. Similar experimental frameworks are adopted to investigate intertemporal allocation decisions in a complex stochastic environment (Anderhub et al, 2000) , social learning (Ballinger et al, 2003) , learning and visceral temptation (Brown et al, 2009) , the effect of persistent income shocks (Carbone et al, 2004) , lump-sum payments (Fatas et al, 2007) and anticipation effects (Luhan et al, 2011) . Other studies adopt interactive frameworks with a production technology and endogenous returns, to test the validity of macroeconomic modeling in a controlled environment (Noussair et al 2000) and study the role of market institutions in facilitating convergence to the optimal steady state (Lei et al, 2002) .
In the experiment, subjects face a finite horizon optimization problem which is based on the lifecycle problem introduced by Hall (1978) . Subjects receive resources in each period and allocate these resources between saving and consumption. In the first treatment the resource stream is predetermined whereas in the second treatment subjects have the freedom to choose a resource stream from a finite number of alternatives before the optimization task. Regardless of the resource path chosen by or given to the subject, the optimal consumption path and hence expected payoff is the same across different scenarios. In order to analyze the first issue that is outlined above we examine the variation in subject responses in treatment 1, and for the second issue we compare subject behavior across treatments.
In our design, choosing a resource stream is equivalent to choosing the size of the pension fund in the real life. When the return offered by the pension fund is equal to the market return, from a theoretical stand point, the pension size has no effect on the optimal consumption path and expected welfare. Therefore, in the experiment a rational agent who does not make systemic mistakes would be indifferent between receiving one income stream or the other in retrospect. She would do equally well under all scenarios and the flexibility of choosing the income stream beforehand would have no effect on her payoff. In the presence of systemic errors, some streams may lead to better outcomes than others, although the net present values of the streams are the same. Namely, some sophisticated subjects may make use of the flexibility by choosing income streams that suit to their own strategies. Our findings suggest that subjects, on average, do not adopt such sophisticated strategies and in contrast they perform worse when they have more flexibility. We argue that this pattern may arise, because subjects pay less attention to the optimization task, believing that the choice of the income profile already brings them closer to the optimal solution. The results also suggest that the decision rules employed by the subjects do not change significantly depending on the income stream that they face.
The experiment 2.1 Model
In the experiment, subjects deal with the following optimization problem:
Where ‫ܥ‬ ௧ is consumption at period t, ‫ܣ‬ ௧ is the financial wealth at the beginning of period t, ݅ ௧ is labor related income received at period t, ‫‬ ௧ is the probability of surviving to period t, and r is the exogenous market interest rate. Individuals live for a maximum of 20 periods. The utility function is of the generalized CRRA form:
This general specification of CRRA function allows us to set ߪ sufficiently high so that decision errors are costly. When ߪ > 1, k should attain a positive value in order to ensure that ‫)ܥ(ܷ‬ > 0 for positive values of ‫.ܥ‬ Whenever k>0, in order to attain ܷ(0) = 0 it is necessary to set a positive ߳.
Although, it is possible to ensure that some of the typical properties of the utility function hold given this rich functional form, it is not guaranteed that the solution to the problem in (1) would be nonnegative in the absence of the 0 ≤ ‫ܥ‬ ௧ condition.
Individuals are assumed to be identical as they receive the same constant wage income when they are working, namely until period 12. An individual may invest a constant fraction of his wage in his pension account during his working life and in return he receives a benefit stream during retirement, namely after period 12. Net income in a given period can be expressed as follows:
where w is the gross wage, ߬ is the contribution rate (0 ≤ ߬ ≤ 1) and ܾ ௧ is the benefit level in period t. Note that specification (3) fully specifies an income profile, such that differences in income can only be explained by differences in (3). All relevant parameters in (3) are set in such a way that, the inequality constraints in (1) are non-binding. 1 In order to accommodate a broad range of income profiles benefit stream is assumed to be decreasing in time, such that 2 :
where m>0. This equation suggests that, in the first retirement period, period 13, subjects receive a pension benefit b andin each of the following periods the benefits decreases by m.
The budget constraint of the pension fund is given as follows:
. It is assumed that a pension fund is able to offer a set of (߬, ܾ, ݉) combinations such that for each combination equation (4) is satisfied. In particular, we consider four scenarios, which are fully determined by the values of these parameters. Low values of τ and b correspond to a steep income 1 This condition is deemed necessary, since it is conceivable that a problem with non-linear decision rules is cognitively more demanding than one with linear decision rules. If inequality constraints are not binding in (1), equation (3) will imply that optimal consumption profiles are the same for any income schedule offered by the pension fund.
2 An obvious alternative is to assume a flat benefit profile. However, this assumption is quite restrictive given the parameter values that we use in the experiment. profile with low retirement benefits whereas higher values of τ and b would imply an income profile with a lower net wage income but higher benefits after retirement. It is also assumed that the individual cannot choose to opt out of the pension fund once he is in.
Equation (4) indicates that the return offered by the pension fund is equal to the unconditional market return r. Hence, in this simple model, the pension fund aggregates the individual mortality risks and keeps the resulting profit. More specifically, if at least one individual dies before reaching the maximum age, the pension fund runs a surplus and otherwise it runs a balanced budget at the aggregate level. 3 Together with the non-binding liquidity constraints assumption, equation (4) ensures that the pension fund has no economic effect other than its possible behavioral effect on decision making. If the constraint 0 ≤ ‫ܥ‬ ௧ ≤ ‫ܣ‬ ௧ is not binding for any t, given equations (2), (3) and (4), optimal consumption decision in period q can be expresses as follows:
Experimental Design
In the experiment, subjects receive experimental tokens and are asked to make a series of conversion decisions. The decision problem in the experiment is the analogue of the optimization problem specified in the previous section, such that, the amount of tokens that subjects receive in each period corresponds to their net period income and the converted amounts corresponds to 3 If the pension fund shares his surplus with the participants, optimal pension size may no longer be indeterminate but a positive amount. In that case the pension fund effectively issues annuities that provide insurance against longevity risk, and some pension schedules may lead to higher welfare than others. Since, it is practically difficult to isolate the role of the pension fund in facilitating better decision making when optimal pension size is positive, it is assumed that the pension fund does not offer any insurance to the participants. consumption decisions. With each conversion decision a part of the token stock is converted to real money whereas the remaining part of the token stock is saved and can be converted in a later period.
When the experiment is terminated the money subjects have earned depends only on the amount of converted tokens. Any remaining, unconverted tokens have no monetary value. The monetary amounts resulting from the conversion decisions are added up and paid to the subjects privately, in cash, at the end of the experiment. Subjects proceed at their own pace and make their decisions individually and sequentially, throughout the experiment. It is not possible to change previous decisions at any point in time. At the beginning, subjects know the number of tokens that they receive in each period. In other words, before making any decision, they are fully informed about the complete income profile.
The subjects can observe the relationship between converted tokens and period earnings on a graph at all times. This conversion function is based on equation (2). We set ߪ = 1.20 , ߳ = 20, and w=2000 which leads to sizable monetary losses for reasonable decision errors. We set ߠ = 0.40 so that expected average earnings are in line with the usual amounts paid in the lab. Finally, in order to have, ܷ(0) = 0, k is set to 1.10. Hence, subjects deal with the following conversion function:
During the experiments subjects can use a calculator, built in the screen, which computes the monetary equivalent of a given number of tokens. In addition, each subject has another simple hand calculator at their disposal during the experiment.
In the experiment, subjects may live for a maximum of 20 periods. In line with equations (3) and (4), it is assumed that each subject receives an exogenous income (gross wage, w) in each period up to period 12. It is also assumed that a fixed fraction of income (wτ) is saved as individual pension contributions, which is to be paid back as benefits during retirement, namely after period 12. In the experiment, the subjects only observe their net income which equivalent to income net of contributions (w(1-τ)) from period 1 to 12 and benefits (ܾ − ‫ݐ(݉‬ − 13)) from period 13 to 20. In other words, subjects do not observe the working of the pension fund nor do they observe the theoretical difference between income net of contributions and benefits. . 4
The only type of uncertainty that the subjects face is lifetime uncertainty. Starting from period 8, the experiment may be terminated depending on the result of a random draw. After period 8, the termination probability, that is the probability that the experiment will not continue to the next period, is equal to 1/13. The subjects are told that this probability is equal to the probability of drawing a red ball out of a bag in which there are 12 blue balls and 1 red ball. 5 From period 8 until the last period, the termination probabilities increase monotonically such that after period 9, the termination probability is 1/12, after period 10 it is 1/11 and so on. Subjects are told that if they survive to the next period 1 blue ball is removed from the bag before making a new draw at the end of the next period. We believe that this resulting survival pattern is a good approximation for the actual average mortality rates. Indeed, actual mortality rates are rather low until a certain age, after which they sharply increase. 6 In addition, for the subjects this pattern makes the problem easier to understand and to remember.
In general, in order to obtain a non-trivial solution to a life-cycle optimization problem it is necessary to impose a no-Ponzi game condition which rules out infinite borrowing. In our case a stronger restriction is needed since we do not want subjects to leave the experiment with negative earnings.
To prevent this from happening we disallow borrowing against future income (tokens). 7 To put it differently, in every period subjects cannot convert more than the sum of unconverted tokens from the previous period and the newly received tokens. ..
Although imposing borrowing constraints solves the problem at hand, it leads to other complexities. 8
In order to avoid the additional difficulty resulting from binding liquidity constraints, in all treatments parameters are set such that liquidity constraints are not binding at the optimum. That is, along the optimal path the number of converted tokens is strictly lower than the sum of accumulated tokens and newly received tokens.
In the experiment we have used four possible scenarios or income profiles, where each scenario is defined by a stream of tokens in each period. These four possible token profiles are given in table 1. 9 7 We could also implement another restriction in which total financial wealth should be bounded away from a negative finite number before period 8, and from period 8 on, it should be bounded away from 0. In order to avoid confusion on behalf of the subjects, borrowing against future tokens is disallowed altogether. 8 See footnote 1. 9 The corresponding ߬'s are 0,0.05,0.10,0.15 respectively. To keep the structure similar across token profiles ߬/݉ ratio is fixed. The corresponding m's are 0,20,40,60. 1900  1800  1700  2  2000  1900  1800  1700  3  2000  1900  1800  1700  4  2000  1900  1800  1700  5  2000  1900  1800  1700  6  2000  1900  1800  1700  7  2000  1900  1800  1700  8  2000  1900  1800  1700  9  2000  1900  1800  1700  10  2000  1900  1800  1700  11  2000  1900  1800  1700  12  2000  1900  1800  1700  13  0  297  594  891  14  0  255  510  765  15  0  213  426  639  16  0  171  342  513  17  0  129  258  387  18  0  87  174  261  19  0  45  90  135  20  0  3  6  9 The scenarios are ordered with respected to the size of the pension fund such that as one moves to the right in the table pension size increases and income profiles get flatter. Scenario A corresponds to the case without pension fund where, during their working lives (periods 1-12), subjects receive the highest possible income and when retired (periods 13-20), they do not receive any income. The motive for saving is the strongest in the case of scenario A and it weakens as pension size increases.
Scenario D corresponds to the case with the largest pension fund. In this scenario, the benefits are highest of all scenarios, yet in exchange the net income in the first 12 periods is lower than the preretirement income in all of the other scenarios.
Graph 1 shows the four income profiles as well as the optimal consumption path. As can be seen from the graph, the optimal level of consumption is constant in the first 8 periods, when the survival probability is 1 and then it falls gradually over time. Furthermore, the graph suggests that, it is possible to rank the income profiles not only in terms of their steepness, but also in terms of their closeness to the optimal consumption profile. Namely, as one moves to the right in table 1, the income profile gets closer to the optimal consumption profile.
We designed two treatments. In treatment 1, subjects receive one of the income profiles in table 1, whereas in treatment 2 subjects have to choose the profile that they would like to receive before they make their first conversion decision. Our first aim is to investigate whether the presence of the pension fund, or equivalently, steepness of the income profile has an effect on subject behavior. For this purpose, we compare subject behavior given different income profiles in treatment 1. In particular, we would like to assess whether average subject performance is dependent on the slope of the income profile. This is achieved by comparing the deviations of actual decisions from optimal decisions under different scenarios in treatment 1. Our second aim is to explore whether subjects behave differently when they have the ability to choose the size of the pension fund, or in other words, slope of the income profile. We address this question by comparing decisions in treatments 1 and 2. We use the same measure of performance to assess whether subjects perform better when they choose the income stream.
Graph 1.Optimal Consumption

Experimental procedure
Invitations were sent to Tilburg University students who have previously indicated that they would like to attend to economic experiments that took place in the campus. 127 participants responded positively to the invitation and took part in one of the two treatments (65 in treatment 1, 62 in treatment 2). Subjects participated in only one of the 10 experimental sessions and in each session only one treatment was run. In treatment 1, subjects were confronted with one of the four possible scenarios, and all subjects in a session had the same scenario. Each session lasted on average about an hour, but since survival probabilities were truly randomly drawn some subjects finished much earlier than others. 10 Following their arrival at the lab, they were randomly seated behind computer terminals, instructions were distributed and read aloud by the experimenter. In order to familiarize 10 We believe that subjects understood and believed that the survival rates were randomly determined. We have received no questions on this aspect of the experiment. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Table 2 shows the number of subjects across treatments and scenarios. First we ran several sessions of treatment 2, in which subjects could choose their preferred scenario. Scenario A was by far the most popular choice followed by scenarios B and D, which were almost equally likely to be chosen.
Results
Descriptive statistics
This preliminary finding suggests that there is a demand for all income profiles that are being offered. Not all scenarios are equally popular, however, as the hypothesis that scenarios are selected randomly by the subjects can be rejected at the 1% level (p=0.001). 11 In treatment 1, the numbers of subjects per scenario are exogenously determined. Here we allocated subjects to scenarios such that the numbers corresponded reasonably well to endogenous selection made in treatment 2. Since the number of observations in each category is limited, in the statistical analyses that follow, observations that fall under scenarios A and B are pooled together and this new category is referred to as the low-pensions category. Similarly scenarios C and D constitute the high-pensions category.
Tables 3 and 4 present the average consumption and average earnings in both treatments for each pension category. The average consumption is the average number of tokens that are converted in each period in that scenario/treatment. At first sight, both differences between treatments and differences between pension categories are relatively small. For example, average earnings in treatment 1 are 0.45 Euro higher than average earnings in treatment 2. 
Results and discussion
Graph 2 shows the income profile, the optimal consumption path and the average consumption for both treatments. Each panel refers to one specific scenario. Note that the optimal profile in this table is the optimal consumption profile in period 0. ... Graph 2: Actual and optimal consumption per income profile
As it is depicted in graph 2, the relationship between income profile and average subject performance is not immediately clear. However, a first impression is that there are quite some differences across panels. This suggests that although the optimal consumption does not depend on the scenario, actual consumption decisions are affected by the income profiles. Secondly, within a panel, the difference between consumption in treatments 1 and 2 seems rather small. While assessing subject performance it may be preferable to account for the changes in the optimal profile as the subject progresses in the experiment.
In the absence of decision errors, the optimal consumption profile depicted in graph 1 and 2 is the same for all scenarios and treatments and it will remain unchanged after each conversion decision.
However, in reality subjects frequently make sub-optimal decisions, which necessitate recalculation of the optimal consumption profile after each decision. For example, if a subject converts 1200 tokes in period 1, instead of the optimal amount of 1653, he should convert 2106 tokens (1653 + (16536-1200) in period 2. In order to capture the magnitude and sign of decision errors the following metric is used:
where ‫ܥ‬ ௧ is the actual consumption decision of subject i in period t and ‫ܥ‬ ௧ * is the corresponding optimal consumption level which is based on the definition in equation 5. In order to assess average life-cycle patterns, ‫ݔ‬ ௧ is averaged across subjects in each treatment.
where N is the number of subjects in a treatment. In the absence of systemic decision errors, ‫̅ݔ‬ ௧ 's would not be statistically different than 0 and they should be independent of experimental specifications. Considering all scenarios together, the evolution of ‫̅ݔ‬ ௧ is markedly similar in treatment 1 and 2 (Graph 3). The lifespan can be divided into three intervals. Between periods 1 and 8 the subject faces no uncertainty and receives a fixed income, between 9 to 12 he faces mortality risk while still receiving the same income and from period 13 on he receives a lower income at a declining rate and faces mortality risk. In both treatments, consumption substantially exceeds optimal consumption level prior to retirement, namely in the second interval and it falls short of optimal consumption consistently during retirement, namely in the third interval. Overall as indicated in table 6, average excess consumption is higher in treatment 2 than in treatment 1, albeit marginally. Graph 4. Actual consumption -optimal consumption, treatment 1
Graph 5. Actual consumption -optimal consumption, treatment 2
Although subject averages move together for high and low pension profiles in treatment 1, in treatment 2 subjects who choose low pensions on average consume consistently more than subjects who choose high pensions. Over consumption is particularly evident in the second stage and more so in treatment 2 and for low pension profile. Although the measure, ഥ is useful for assessing average over-consumption and under-consumption patterns it may not be the right measure for assessing subject performance, since one subject's over-consumption is completely offset by another subject's under-consumption of equal magnitude.
In order to compare average subject performance across specifications, the absolute value of deviations from the optimal can be used instead:
In the case of ‫ݔ‬ ௧ , it is assumed that the decision errors are symmetric and characterized by a normal distribution which is no longer a valid assumption in the case of ‫ݕ‬ ௧ . It is assumed that the error terms are normally distributed and truncated below from 0, which is consistent with the assumption adopted in the previous analysis. According to the results of truncated regressions, which are reported in table 7, average subject performance does not depend on wage profile in treatment 1.
However, subjects who choose the high pension profile in treatment 2 perform worse than their counterparts in treatment 1. There is only limited evidence in favor of selection effects since a similar variation is not present in the case of low pension profile in treatment 2. 
Decision rules
The different life-cycle consumption patterns, especially differing levels of over-consumption prior to retirement suggests that subjects may employ different decision rules in these two treatments.
There are virtually an unlimited number of heuristic decision rules that subjects could use. In the following analysis, three natural candidates are considered: i) consuming a constant amount ii) consuming a constant fraction of income iii) consuming a constant fraction of financial wealth in each period. In addition to these strategies, a subject may employ any combination of these pure strategies. For example, one subject's responses may be best explained by a linear combination of consume a constant amount strategy and consume a constant fraction of financial wealth strategy, whereas another subject may only follow a consume a constant fraction of income strategy. It is also possible that a subject follows the optimal consumption profile closely and does not employ any of the three heuristics systematically. If optimal consumption is not controlled for, its effect on actual consumption decision will be picked up by other variables since optimal consumption is a function of current income and financial wealth. For this reason, based on equation (5) an optimal consumption variable is created and added to the set of explanatory variables.
As a precursor to a more detailed analysis, the explanatory power of these decision rules is tested on aggregate level without any individual-specific effects. In these estimations, actual consumption is explained by optimal consumption, current income, current financial wealth and a constant which are possible determinants of actual consumption decisions as it is discussed above. If the subjects made no systemic decision errors, the coefficient of the optimal consumption variable should not be statistically different than 1 and all the other explanatory variables such as current income and financial wealth should have insignificant coefficients. If any of the explanatory variables other than optimal consumption turn out to be significant, this means that subject on average employ suboptimal rules systematically.
Despite substantial variation in subject performance, average consumption loosely tracks optimal consumption in both treatments and for all scenarios. In the model with only optimal consumption, optimal consumption is a significant predictor of actual consumption and the coefficient that corresponds to this variable is not statistically different in the two treatments. However, in all cases this coefficient is substantially lower than 1 (p=0.001), which indicates that decisions are on average far from optimal. Note that, in the first set of regressions, the optimal consumption variable may also pick up the impact of current income on consumption decision as optimal consumption profile and income profile are highly correlated. When the current income variable is added to the set of covariates the impact of these two factors are observed separately. The results on table 9 suggest that actual consumption decisions are more sensitive to current income in treatment 2 than in treatment 1. Optimal consumption predicts actual consumption equally well in treatment 1 and treatment 2 yet is still significantly lower than 1 (p=0.001). When constant terms are excluded, in addition to higher sensitivity of consumption to income in treatment 2, it is observed that optimal consumption predicts consumption decisions more strongly in treatment 1. This pattern suggests that, subjects may be using these two strategies as substitutes. When financial wealth is added as a regressor, it enters as a significant determinant of consumption decisions in both treatments. In theory marginal propensity to consume out of current income should be the same as marginal propensity to consume out of financial assets excluding current income. However both variables should be irrelevant once optimal consumption is accounted for. In both treatments subjects are over sensitive to current income as well as financial wealth and more so in treatment 2. More precisely, when income or financial wealth is higher (lower) subjects consume more (less) in excess of optimal consumption. Given that the sample averages of income and financial wealth are 1566.737 and 1608.203 respectively, on average, over-sensitivity to current income leads to a much larger deviation from the optimal solution than over-sensitivity to financial wealth. The coefficient of the constant term does not differ significantly across treatments, which suggests that on average subjects avoid constant consumption strategy, although it is arguably similar to the other two strategies in terms of both simplicity and effectiveness. The coefficient of optimal consumption is less than 1 as before. (p=0.001)
These findings also suggest that the decision rules that the subjects employ to solve the optimization problem depend on the availability of the pension fund. In treatment 2, where subjects do not have the ability to alter their income streams, they are on average more likely to follow the sub-optimal decision rules that are considered above. It is still not clear if this pattern emerges mainly because subjects are simply more sensitive to current income or because consumption decisions in treatment 2 are more likely to follow the income profile on a 1-to-1 basis. In fact, in both treatments subjects frequently choose a consumption level that is equal to their current income. The frequency of such observations is statistically higher in treatment 2 (25.77%), than in treatment 1 (%17.87) according to chi-squared test (p=0.01). Therefore, higher coefficient of the current income variable in treatment 2 is at least partly driven by observations where consumption is equal to current income.
Possibly in treatment 2, subjects may be led to think that one of the scenarios provide the right answer to the given problem such that once the right stream chosen consumption decisions should follow the income stream. However, this explanation falls short of explaining the higher coefficient of the current financial wealth variable in treatment 2. The findings in this section also suggest that, following current income or financial wealth may be regarded a substitute for following the optimal consumption profile, since, in general, when explanatory power of optimal consumption is lower (higher), explanatory power of both current income and financial wealth is higher (lower). It is also plausible that following the optimal consumption profile is arguably more challenging than the other alternatives. Therefore, it may be argued that the added flexibility of choosing the pension profile possibly leads to overconfidence and/or less attention which gives rise to over-sensitivity of consumption to both current income and financial wealth.
-Individual Effects
The analysis in the previous section gives a general idea about average decision patterns across treatments and pension profiles, although the explanatory power of the models are notably low.
Some of the restrictive assumptions used in this section can be replaced by more realistic ones. For example, although it is plausible that each subject follows a different decision rule and therefore explanatory variables may have different weights for each subject, we do not allow for individual specific effects in the OLS regressions. In order to capture this type of heterogeneity, it is assumed that individual effects are relevant not only for the intercept but also for other coefficients. One way to introduce individual effects is to use fixed effects, which is equivalent to the pooled OLS analysis with individual dummies and interaction terms that involve individual dummies and other regressors. Since the number of variables to be estimated exceeds the number of observations, such a model is not identified. In order to remedy this problem, it is assumed that each individual effect is drawn from a population with a certain statistical distribution and unknown parameters of this distribution is estimated instead. This specification is known as the random effects or random coefficients specification and the empirical model is defined as follows:
With treatment effects this linear model can be expressed as:
where ݀ is the treatment dummy for subject i. In order to account for additional variability due to treatment, the residual term is modeled as follows:
where both components are normally distributed conditional on regressors:
In both random effects specifications, ߚ terms are treated as fixed effects and it is assumed that ߙ terms are drawn from different normal distributions with zero mean and unknown variance such that: 13
In the first specification in table 11, it is also assumed that different types of individual fixed effects have zero covariance so that residual terms (ߝ ௧ ) are independent of each other.
Note that this assumption may be restrictive, since in practice subjects may substitute one decision strategy with another decision strategy, which means that individual fixed effects that correspond to different variables are not independent. In the second specification a more flexible covariance structure is adopted. In this specification the covariance matrix is assumed to be as follows:
where M and N are 4 by 4 for matrices. According to this assumption individual random effects can be correlated with each other in a given treatment, whereas they are uncorrelated across treatments. If these assumptions are indeed correct, random effects estimates obtained by maximum likelihood estimation will be consistent and efficient and otherwise they will be inconsistent. In this particular case, pooled OLS and random effect specifications lead to similar results. As in the previous section, according to the null hypothesis of no systemic decision errors, the coefficient of optimal consumption is 1 and the coefficients of other explanatory variables are 0.
In all cases, the coefficient of optimal consumption is considerably lower than 1 and other factors have positive and significant coefficients. As in the pooled OLS case, the coefficients differ considerably across treatments and all patterns are qualitatively similar. Given either covariance 13 The random effects specification is also referred as mixed effects specification as we random individual effects are broken into two parts, namely the fixed part, ߚ ݇ terms, and the random part ߙ ݅ ݇ terms. structure, in treatment 2 subjects tend to follow current income and financial wealth more closely and optimal consumption profile less closely compared to subjects in treatment 1. 
-Across pension profiles
Given the average subject performance under different pension profiles in treatment 1, it can be argued that subjects regard low and high pension profiles equally challenging. This observation is unchanged when one controls for other factors and adopts a random coefficient specification. The regression results on table 12 suggest that, they adopt similar decision rules in these two cases. It cannot be rejected that optimal consumption is an equally strong predictor of actual consumption for high and low pension profiles in treatment 1. Hence, scenarios can be regarded as equally challenging not only because the optimal solutions that correspond to each profile are identical but also because subjects do equally well and employ similar strategies under both pension profiles.
Given this equivalence result, it is unlikely to observe systemic self-selection into pension profiles in treatment 2. Indeed, in treatment 2, subject performance is also not significantly different across pension profiles as in treatment 1 and therefore there is no evidence in favor of such self-selection. The other way to compare subject behavior in different settings is to analyze the differences across treatments for a given pension profile. The cross-profile and cross-treatment analysis suggests that variation across treatments is stronger than the variation across pension profiles. The latter analysis reveals that, for the low pension profile subject behavior varies significantly across treatments, whereas for the high pension profile no treatment effect is observed. Hence, it can be concluded that, higher sensitivity to current income and financial wealth in treatment 2 is mostly driven by the differences between subjects who choose low pension profile in treatment 2 and who are by default given a low pension profile in treatment 1. This may be due to the fact that, for the low pension profile, income and optimal consumption are likely to be less correlated compared to high pension profile and hence observing a statistically significant difference across treatments is more likely in the case of low pension profile. In a similar manner, the insensitivity of subject behavior to income profiles in both treatments may stem from the fact that, the variation between scenario A and scenario D is not sufficiently large to affect subject behavior. By incorporating a positive interest rate (r), it may be possible to create a larger wedge between the flat and steep income profiles and test if subject behavior is still insensitive to income profiles given a larger variation. With a positive the gap between optimal consumption and income profiles is also widened, which means that it is relatively easy to identify the factors that affect subject behavior in the presence of a positive interest rate.
Trends throughout experimental life
So far it is assumed that individuals employ the same decision rules throughout their life time and hence individual effects are time-invariant. Another factor which may potentially lead to timevariant behavior is learning. Since the experimental life is divided into three distinct phases by design, further insights can be achieved by breaking the life-cycle into three intervals and running regressions separately for each interval.
In Graph 3, we observe overconsumption prior to retirement in both treatments and more so in treatment 2. Such deviations from the optimal profile may arise simply because, as it is argued in the previous sections, consumption decisions are sensitive to current income, which is likely to be higher than optimal consumption prior to retirement.
Alternatively, it can be argued that consumption tracks current income simply because subjects cannot accurately compute conditional probabilities and try to avoid the uncertainty that stems from their inability to do complex calculations. If subjects underestimate their survival chances or believe that retirement periods accompany ambiguity which should be avoided, they may underconsume during the later stages of their experimental life. This explanation implies observationally similar results as the income-sensitivity explanation that is proposed above. Namely, even if subjects under-consume during retirement as a result of under-estimation of survival probabilities and ambiguity aversion, this pattern may be picked up by the current income variable, simply because during retirement current income is often lower than optimal consumption. This argument entails some statistically testable implications.
As it is pointed out above, by design experimental life consists of 3 stages. Random effects regressions are run for each stage separately. The constant terms are left out in order to avoid the identification problem which results from the fact that income is constant during stage 1 and 2. For ease of presentation, in table 14 interval-specific regressions are reported instead. The findings reveal that on average the subjects perform better as they progress, which lends support to both the learning and ambiguity aversion hypothesis. That is to say, subject performance may improve gradually either because subjects become more proficient or because the uncertainties are partly resolved. However, even after controlling for stage-effects current income variable enter with positive and significant coefficients in all stages. That is to say, subjects are likely to employ rule-ofthumb behavior throughout the life-cycle even after they are relatively familiar with the experiment.
It is also clear that ambiguity aversion alone cannot explain the overconsumption pattern prior to retirement.
The results also suggest that subjects in treatment 1 do not outperform other subjects in a specific stage, however overall they are less sensitive to income and financial wealth. Therefore, subjects in treatment 1 and 2 are unlikely to differ in terms of learning speed. The same point can be made for subject who chose different pension profiles in treatment 2. It can be concluded that timedependent behavior is unlikely to influence the results that are reported in the previous sections. After the experiment, 46 of the subjects who participate in the second treatment are asked to indicate the scenario that they would choose, in case the experiment was rerun. 43.48% of the subjects declared that they would choose an income stream other than their original stream. The probability of choosing an income stream other than the original one is independent of the original choice (p=0.653). Nevertheless, a majority (% 64.89) of these subjects who would choose another scenario indicates that they would choose an income profile that is flatter than their original income profile. This asymmetry arises primarily due to the relative popularity of the steepest income profile. The "prefer another profile" and "prefer flatter profile" dummies correspond to these two groups of subjects who would choose another income profile and who would choose a flatter income profile in retrospect. The subjects who chose another income profile other than the original profile are on average more sensitive to income and financial wealth compared to other subjects. Therefore, subjects are possibly aware of the fact that their strategies are further from the optimal than average. The correlation between inconsistency of income profile choices and poor performance during the experiment will also arise if both patterns are affected by lack of attention. In this case, it is not possible to conclude which explanation is the valid one. Furthermore, since it is not possible to deduce whether the subjects would indeed do better if they chose the hypothetical profile in the first place, it is not clear if the inconsistency of original and retrospective choices imply learning. The results in the last column of table 17 suggest that, choosing a flatter profile has no additional impact on behavior, other than the impact of choosing a profile different than the original one.
Risk aversion
Heterogeneity in risk aversion may potentially explain several patterns, including the variance in subject performance in general and the choice of the pension profile in treatment 2. After the experiment, a Holt and Laury (2002) type risk-aversion test is conducted where subjects make 10 binary choices between simple lotteries and receive a payment based on one of the choices that they make. The risk aversion dummy in table 18, measures whether the subject's risk aversion score is higher than average. If risk aversion is indeed relevant, risk-averse subjects will consume less than optimal in the early periods and higher than optimal later on which should lead to a seemingly poor performance. However, when income and financial wealth variables are left out, the interaction of risk aversion and optimal consumption is insignificant which indicates that risk-averse subjects are not likely to perform better or worse than other subjects. Furthermore, according to results in table 19, risk-averse subjects do not consume less than other subjects in treatment 1 between periods 1 and 8. Therefore, there is no statistically significant relationship between measured risk aversion and consumption decisions. It is also possible that some scenarios are regarded as safer than others.
However, as indicated in table 20, risk-aversion is also not a statistically significant factor in scenario selection. 
Demographics
In the end of the sessions, 56 subjects are asked to fill out a survey which includes demographic questions. According to the results, there is no systemic relationship between behavior and personal characteristics such as age, gender, nationality, years of education and type of education. 
Conclusion
In reality, economic agents deal with complex problems where the solution of is unlikely to be obtained analytically. By examining the data from an experiment, it is shown that, even when subjects deal with a simple version the life-cycle consumption optimization problem, they use decision rules that deviate systematically from the optimal solution. More specifically, on average they over-respond to contemporaneous conditions such as their current income and financial wealth. This pattern is consistent across different problem specifications and more pronounced when subjects have the ability to choose from different income profiles which are theoretically equivalent. The findings support the claim that higher flexibility does not necessarily imply better decision making and on the contrary it may lead to poorer performance. Further research may clarify the decision making process that lead to such a counter-intuitive result. Our findings imply that the underlying reason is likely to be lack of attention or overconfidence following the choice of the income profile.
Given these patterns, it can also be concluded that shifting the responsibilities from pension funds to pensioners may not always produce better outcomes. Policy makers and pension designers may potentially influence the welfare of pensioners by restricting the number of possible pension plans.
Further analysis with field data may provide further insights into the relationship between flexibility and decision making. However, since it is often difficult to obtain data that suits to this purpose controlled experiments may still play an important role in future analysis.
